A Study of John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio

– A Turning Point in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics

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I. Introduction: The Historical and Philosophical Context of Scotus

John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266–1308) was a central figure in the Franciscan intellectual tradition and one of the most influential scholastic philosophers of the High Middle Ages. His mature thought is best represented in his major work, the Ordinatio, a revised and expanded version of his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences delivered at the University of Paris. Through this work, Scotus made bold and innovative contributions to scholastic theology and metaphysics.

At the time, the dominant philosophical paradigm was the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis, in which essence was considered prior to existence and intellect superior to the will. In contrast, Scotus developed a more nuanced and detailed philosophical system, characterized by the univocity of being, the principle of individuation through haecceitas, and the priority of the will over the intellect. His rigorous and subtle reasoning earned him the title Doctor Subtilis, “the Subtle Doctor.”

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II. The Univocity of Being

One of Scotus’s most revolutionary claims was the univocity of being. He argued that the concept of being (conceptus entis) applies in the same way to both God and creatures. This was a direct rejection of Aquinas’s doctrine of the analogy of being (analogia entis), which held that the term “being” has fundamentally different meanings when applied to God and creatures.

“Conceptus entis est univocus tam de Deo quam de creatura.”
(The concept of being is univocal for both God and the creature.)
– Ordinatio I, d.3, pars 1, q.1

According to Scotus, without univocal terms, we could not make meaningful philosophical or theological statements about God. Univocity thus provides a shared ontological foundation for metaphysical reasoning, allowing for rational proofs of God's existence. This idea laid the groundwork for later developments in modern metaphysics, including those by Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant.

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III. Haecceitas and the Principle of Individuation

In medieval metaphysics, the question of individuation—what makes a thing the unique entity it is—was central. Whereas Aquinas located individuation in the designated matter (materia signata), Scotus introduced the concept of haecceitas, or “thisness,” as the ultimate principle of individuation.

“Haecceitas est ultima differentia constitutiva individui.”
(Haecceity is the ultimate differentiating principle that constitutes the individual.)
– Ordinatio II, d.3

For Scotus, individuality is not merely the result of matter or accidental properties, but is grounded in a formal, non-material principle inherent in the thing itself. Haecceitas accounts for why an entity is this particular being and not another. This concept significantly influenced later theories of personal identity, subjectivity, and legal personhood, and it remains a valuable resource in philosophical discussions of individuality.

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IV. The Priority of the Will and Libertas Indifferentiae

Scotus places the will (voluntas) at the center of moral and metaphysical freedom. Contrary to Aquinas, who argued for the primacy of the intellect over the will, Scotus asserted that the will is the higher faculty.

“Voluntas est superior intellectu, quia libere eligit inter opposita.”
(The will is superior to the intellect because it freely chooses between opposites.)
– Ordinatio II, d.25

This means that the human will is not determined by intellectual judgment but possesses autonomous freedom to choose among contrary options. Scotus coined the term libertas indifferentiae (“freedom of indifference”) to describe this capacity. His voluntarism laid the philosophical foundation for later modern theories of free will, moral responsibility, and subjective autonomy.

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V. Divine Command and Moral Law

Scotus reconfigures the theory of natural law by emphasizing the role of God’s free will as the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. While acknowledging that human reason can discern moral principles, Scotus maintains that the binding nature of these principles stems from God’s sovereign will.

“Bonum quia Deus vult, non Deus vult quia bonum.”
(Something is good because God wills it, not because God wills it due to its goodness.)
– Ordinatio I, d.47

This formulation challenges the classical position that morality is grounded entirely in rational nature. For Scotus, the moral order is ultimately contingent, not necessary—but it is not arbitrary. God’s will is always rational and directed toward the good. Thus, Scotus upholds a divine command theory that avoids the pitfalls of arbitrariness and preserves both divine sovereignty and moral intelligibility.

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VI. Conclusion: The Philosophical Legacy of Scotus

John Duns Scotus’s Ordinatio marks a critical turning point in medieval thought and paves the way for modern philosophical inquiries. His doctrine of the univocity of being reshaped metaphysical discourse, while his theory of haecceity laid the groundwork for conceptions of individuality and personhood. Furthermore, his prioritization of the will over the intellect prefigured modern understandings of freedom, ethics, and subjectivity.

While deeply rooted in the scholastic tradition, Scotus's thought transcended its framework and anticipated key themes in modern philosophy. His work continues to offer profound resources for scholars in metaphysics, ethics, theology, and political philosophy. His vision of being, personhood, and divine freedom remains both intellectually rigorous and spiritually provocative.